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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is present in this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-
103(2)0).' 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Appellee Payson City Corporation (herein "City35) agrees with the Statement 
of Issues and Standard of Review in the Brief of Appellant. 
PROVISIONS OF STATUTES AND RULES 
The City agrees that Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Payson 
City Ordinance 07-05-95 as stated by Appellant are central to the importance of this 
appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a breach of contract action brought by Plaintiff and Appellant John 
Johnson (herein "Johnson") against the City, and arising out of a Reimbursement 
Agreement between the parties dated August 13, 1997. (The purpose of the 
Reimbursement Agreement was to reimburse for offsite infrastructure that was to be 
installed and would serve the development property as well as other city residents. 
The land that was the subject of the Reimbursement Agreement is referred to herein 
as the "Property".) After the close of discovery, the City moved for summary 
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judgment. [R. 117-167.]1 The motion was briefed and argued and on February 4, 
2011, the lower court entered a Ruling granting the motion. [R. 211- 216.] A 
final Order dismissing the case was entered below on February, 22, 2011. [R. 217-
220.] This appeal followed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Although it is incomplete, the City agrees with the Statement of Facts of 
Johnson, with one clarification: Johnson never owned any part or portion of the 
Property. His ex-wife Lana Johnson owned a 50% interest in the Property from 
June 15, 1995, until she sold it to Carrie Woods on August 4, 1997. [R. 156, 143.] 
Johnson claimed a beneficial interest in the Property by virtue of his marriage to 
Lana Johnson, apparently unaware that the ancient doctrines of dower and curtsey 
were abolished in 1975 by the Utah Legislature when the Uniform Probate Code 
was adopted in Utah. See Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-112 (1975, as amended 1998.) 
Subsequent to the Property being purchased on August 4, 1997 by Ray Hiatt 
and Carrie Woods, 100% of the infrastructure was constructed and placed by Ray 
and Noell Hiatt. [R. 134-135.]2 Whatever interest Johnson had in the Property 
1
 The Record in this case is paginated backwards, so on any given document, 
a lower page number actually means the citation is further toward the end of the 
document. This unfortunate fact makes the Record citations very confusing. 
2
 An unnumbered page exists in the Record between pages 134 and 135. 
2 
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ceased to exist \A A lei i tl ic: Pr operty was sold to "VV oods and I Iiatt on August 4, 1 997 , 
thei i donated a i ly rein ibi :i rsement d i ie for tl le ii lfrastr i icti i re back t :) the Cit; • |[ B 
1 94, ] Ii I doing so,, tl: icy rel ied oi l City Ord i na nee 07 5 95 ra ther tl la i i tl I z 
Reimbursement Agreement that Johnson had obta i r ied [B ] 2] ] 28. ] ' line w ork 
was all bonded b) die Hiatts and they posted a Letter of Credit with the City to 
secure completion of the infrastructure. [R. 12 S | 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Both the- Reimbursement Agreement and the City Ordinance required as a 
condition of payment that the applicant prove to the City Engineer \\\A the 
infrastructure had been i-uii. *.. i)aiuh«i in HK .ip^u.mt ,nid then the costs of 
construction had to be justih^;. ..MiiMiii *M. .P^ ^ U ^ in*. ,j,iiin.s ivcausc he 
neither bi i ilt not pa id for t 1 ie ii lfrastn :i cture. I lis argument was that he was paying 
( h e l l i a l t s h\ i v t l t i i mi?, t h e p i n t nf l lu- ILun), llnil IIIR'II h e IK ci n w n c d ih t I  .m in III, s o 
that wa s impossible Oi l tl i< Dse facts, there is si nipl) ' i 10 d ispi ite J ol :i i ISOI i ti: ies tc 
controvert his own deposition testimonywir a- - \\Vulv. i 
his deposition testimony was clear. The Hiatts denied any deal with Johnson after 
they acquired the Property and he was unable to present sufficient proof to die 
Court after the City had made a prima facie case that Johnson was not entitled to 
3 
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reimbursement. As a result, Johnson's claim must fail and the decision of the lower 
court should be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
I T IS UNDISPUTED THAT JOHNSON FAILED TO CREATE 
A MATERIAL DISPUTE OF FACT RESPECTING A KEY 
ELEMENT OF H I S CLAIM AND THUS SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT WAS PROPER. 
When a summary judgment motion has been filed and the movant has 
established & prima facie defense against a claim, the other party who bears the 
burden of proof at trial must come forth and present contrary evidence sufficient to 
create a material issue of fact, or lose the motion. Orvis v. Tohnson, 2008 UT 2 11 7, 
177 P.3d 600, 602. And, the non-moving party cannot do this with a conclusory 
affidavit that conflicts with his own deposition. Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170, 
1173 (Utah 1983); Gawv. State, 798 P.2d 1130 (UT App. 1990); See also Murdock 
v. Springville Municipal Corporation, 1999 UT 39, 982 P.2d 65. 
Here, the City filed its motion and set out in some detail with deposition 
testimony, documents and affidavits, that the infrastructure that Johnson sought 
reimbursement for had in fact been constructed and paid for by Noell & Ray Hiatt. 
These gentlemen had proven this fact to the City Engineer, provided back-up 
invoices to establish value and then donated the infrastructure to the City. [R. 121-
4 
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128.] This was specifically noted by Judge Mortensen in his Ruling. [R. 214.] The 
solitary evidence posited by Johnson to support this aspect of his claim came from an 
Affidavit he filed that, without foundation, stated that, CT hired Ray Hiatt to provide 
his labor and materials and install the infrastructure on the property. Ray Hiatt 
agreed that he would be paid for his labor and materials as the individual lots sold.5' 
[R. 179 1111 9, 10.] In his Appellate Brief, Johnson cites to deposition excerpts from 
the Noell Hiatt deposition, claiming that Hiatt's deposition established that an 
agreement existed between Noell Hiatt, his father Ray Hiatt and Johnson, to the 
effect that the Hiatts would install the infrastructure to the Property and Johnson 
would pay them. What is not explained, however, is that Johnson never performed 
on that oral agreement, the deal changed and thereafter Ray Hiatt and Carrie Woods 
bought the Property and Johnson was out of the picture. [R. 131.] At the end of 
the day, Johnson paid nothing for the infrastructure that was installed. Id. The 
Affidavit statements were, of course, inconsistent with statements by Hiatt and were 
unsupported by any other evidence or statement. [R. 131.] To the contrary, all of 
the documentary evidence indicated that the infrastructure had been paid for by the 
Hiatts themselves, and that Johnson was in no position to pay by reducing property 
sales prices because his spouse had sold the Property and he had never owned it. [ R. 
121-128,131, 149-157.] Johnson's assertion that he discounted the Property when 
5 
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it was sold and that is how he paid the Hiatts for the infrastructure is further 
discredited by the fact that Lana Johnson sold her interest in the Property to Carrie 
Woods - not Ray Hiatt. [R. 143.] In his deposition, Johnson admitted that by 
August 4, 1997, the Property had been sold, that he no longer had any property 
interest in it and that he had no agreement with the new owners. [R. 197-198.] 
Specifically, he stated that: 
Q.: . . . And so on August 4th of 1997, none of the five owners that you 
represented as the developer were property owners in Payson Meadow Subdivision; 
is that correct? 
A.: As of what point? 
Q.: As of August 4th when your wife was the last one to transfer her interest in 
the Payson Meadows to Ms. Woods? 
A.: That is correct. 
Q.: . . . Did you have any agreement with Mr. Ray Hiatt - I can include Mr. 
Noel Hiatt too. They were in the construction business - or Ms. Carrie Woods, to 
continue to represent the owners of the property in developing the Payson Meadows 
Subdivision? 
A.: No, sir. 
6 
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Id 
This testimony was inconsistent with the Affidavit he filed. 
From all of this, the trial court concluded that Johnson had failed to present 
any evidence that he had performed and paid for infrastructure, and further 
concluded that it was impossible for Johnson to have the agreement he contended in 
his Affidavit because he had no interest in the Property and the interest of his ex-wife 
had been sold. [R< 212-213.] In other words, if the alleged agreement is to 
discount the price of property to pay for infrastructure, one must first own the 
property in order to be able to discount it. There was no evidence presented that 
Johnson ever owned the Property or any portion thereof, or that the sales price to 
Ray Hiatt and/or Carrie Woods had been discounted. 
Thus, in the Court below, Johnson failed to present sufficient evidence to 
create a material fact dispute on key elements of his claim - for which he bore the 
evidentiary burden at trial. As a result, under the rule of Orvis, the City is entided to 
summary judgment as the lower court ruled. 
CONCLUSION 
The City respectfully requests that the ruling of the lower court granting its 
Motion for Summary Judgment be affirmed. Johnson failed to present evidence 
that he paid for or installed the infrastructure for which he sought reimbursement. 
7 
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Such proof was a key element of his claim for which he had the burden of proof at 
trial. The failure is fatal to Johnson's case and the trial court correctly granted the 
Motion for Summary Judgment. Its decision should be affirmed. 
°CL 
DATED this /ff day of August, 2011. 
WILLIAMS & H U N T 
By <^^U^ S^^LSjj-
JODY K BlZfRNETT 
GEORGE A^HXJNT 
Attorneys for Appellee 
Payson City Corporation 
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